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We have not lived long enough: Sensemaking and learning from bushfire in Australia 
 
By 











Organizations increasingly find themselves responding to unprecedented natural disasters that 
are experienced as complex, unpredictable and harmful. We examine how organizations 
make sense and learn from these novel experiences by examining three Australian bushfires. 
We show how sensemaking and learning occurred during the public inquiries that followed 
these events, as well as how learning continued afterwards with the help of ‘learning cues.’ 
We propose a model that links public inquiry activities to changes in organizational practices. 
Given the interesting times in which we live, this model has important implications for future 
research on how new organizational practices can be enacted after public inquiries have 
concluded their work.  
 




Over the last decade, the earth’s natural environment has provoked a growing and 
justifiable level of concern over our ability to cope with major catastrophes (Pelling, 2010). 
Atmospheric scientists are attributing higher temperatures, wind speeds and moisture deficits 
to climate change, which is subsequently causing natural disasters that have become more 
frequent, complex and devastating (Birkman, 2006). Hence, in the last decade we have 
witnessed earthquakes, flooding, droughts and bushfires becoming more frequent and more 
damaging (Glade et al., 2010). Such natural disasters are proving to be a challenge for 
emergency management practitioners, including government ministers, policy-makers, police 
officers, fire fighters, weather forecasters and geospatial analysts. Despite being well 
prepared, organizations still struggle to respond effectively to natural disasters (Mileti, 1999) 
because their learning from previous events is undermined when new or unfamiliar 
conditions unfold.  
Natural disasters are what Weick (1988) refers to as high impact-low probability 
events, meaning that they interact with actors, systems and routines in the organizational 
environment in a manner that is often rapid, unpredictable, harmful and on an unprecedented 
scale. Such disasters impose significant losses and damages on communities globally. 
Nevertheless, and perhaps surprisingly, critics argue that they have received less scholarly 
attention than ‘man-made’ crises in organizational, industrial or political contexts (Sellnow et 
al., 2002). This study therefore looks specifically at the case of natural disasters to explore 
how organizational sensemaking and learning unfold in situations where actors struggle with 
novel conditions. It does so by examining the case of bushfire in Victoria, Australia. 
In a normal year, during the summer months, Australia is prone to high levels of 
bushfire risk and there are times when such risk is greatly exacerbated by the early onset of 
summer, prolonged drought, high wind speeds and low humidity. These conditions mean that, 
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when fire is ignited, it creates what Colville et al. (2013: 1201) refer to as ‘circumstances that 
are suffused with dynamic complexity’. Three such bushfires that continue to live in the 
collective memory of Victorians are the focus of this paper: the Black Friday Fires, 1939 (71 
lives lost); the Ash Wednesday Fires 1983 (75 lives lost: 47 in Victoria and 28 in South 
Australia); and the Black Saturday Fires 2009 (173 lives lost). In each case, the organizations 
responsible for managing these fires faced conditions that, despite their experience with 
bushfires, were experienced as surprising, overwhelming and rare. They represented what 
Weick (1993: 634) refers to as cosmology episodes, when ‘the sense of what is occurring and 
the means to rebuild that sense collapse together’. Many of those who lived through them 
express sentiments that echo Weick (1993: 634–635): ‘I’ve never been here before, I have no 
idea where I am, and I have no idea who can help me’.   
Our study shows how the inquiries that followed each of these fires constructed them 
as novel, justifying the need for retrospective sensemaking and learning through deliberative 
public inquiry processes. It shows how sensemaking and learning occurred during the 
inquiries, as well as suggesting how ‘learning cues’ provided a basis for the double loop 
learning that occurred during the inquiry to extend beyond it and led to changes in 
organizational practices. In this way, our study responds to the call for research to explore the 
theoretical and practical importance of how actors ‘learn to make sense, and make sense to 
learn’ (Colville et al., 2013: call for papers). It makes the following contributions. First, it 
provides an empirical exploration of sensemaking and learning associated with three natural 
disasters that were described as unprecedented, dynamically complex events. Second, it 
shows how both sensemaking and learning can occur through the process of holding public 
inquiries. This is important because most of the theoretical focus on public inquiries has been 
in relation to sensemaking; we know far less about whether and how inquiries engender 
learning. Third, our study develops a general model that sets the stage for future research on 
how new organizational practices come into being after inquiries have concluded their work.  
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The remainder of this article reviews the literature on sensemaking and learning, with 
a particular focus on public inquiry processes. It then explains the methods associated with 
our qualitative, interpretive study of three bushfires. We then present the findings and 
develop a model of sensemaking and learning. Finally, we discuss the implications. 
Sensemaking  
Sensemaking is ‘an ongoing process that creates an intersubjective sense of shared 
meanings through conversation and non-verbal behavior in face to face settings where actors 
seek to produce, negotiate and maintain a shared sense of meaning’ (Gephart et al., 2010: 
284–285). It comprises two primary concepts (Weick, 1995). First, the sensing component is 
built on the premise that actors draw on their lived experience, which is informed by their 
identity, and influences how they respond to stimuli such as events, triggers and surprises 
(Weick et al., 2005). Cognitively, actors struggle to respond in a meaningful way in an 
environment where events are perceived to be novel, triggers are seen as sudden, and surprise 
is experienced as continuous because existing cues and frames offer little or no insight into 
what is unfolding (Colville et al., 2012; Colville et al., 2013). Second, the making component 
is built on the premise that people attempt to enact or create, sensible environments, through 
‘conversational and social practices’ (Gephart, 1993: 1469) about specific events to arrive at 
an understanding about what is plausible, rather than objectively accurate (Weick, 1995). 
Actors use questioning, framing, bracketing and storytelling to give meaning to 
organizational issues in a way that provides the basis for action, even during crises and 
disasters (Brown and Jones, 2000; Maitlis, 2005).  
Crises and disasters trigger ‘sensebreaking’ moments where people lose their ability 
to impose meaning on events and routines are interrupted (Mantere, et al., 2012). As a result, 
they also provide powerful conditions for sensemaking as people ask: What is going on? 
(Weick, 1993) This questioning provides the opportunity to create new meanings, allowing 
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individuals to understand their experiences and, if there is consensus, facilitate co-ordinated 
action (Weick, 1995). However, when individuals fail to understand the implications and 
lessons to be gleaned from major crises and disasters, they are likely to engage in behaviors 
with unintended or even tragic consequences because they are confronting novel situations 
that they do not know how to gauge, process and manage (Weick, 1990). 
Learning 
The concept of organizational learning suggests that organizations learn from 
previous experiences in the same way as individuals share mental modes that detect and 
correct errors by altering the organization’s theory of action (Argyris and Schön, 1996). Such 
learning is triggered when actors experience: 
[A] surprising mismatch between expected and actual results of action and 
respond to that mismatch through a process of thought and further action that 
leads them to modify their images of organization or their understandings of 
organizational phenomena and to restructure their activities so as to bring 
outcomes and expectations into line, thereby changing organizational theory-
in-use (Argyris and Schön, 1978:16). 
Hence, organizational learning occurs to the extent that actors extract knowledge from 
systems at the individual and group levels of the organization (Argyris, 1976) so that change 
can be made in an evidence-based manner through intuiting, interpreting, integrating and 
institutionalizing (Crossan, et al., 1999) in ways that identify and correct errors.  
Argyris (1976) argues that such learning occurs in two ways. First, single loop 
learning occurs through error correction, but without altering the underlying governing values 
of the system and/or organization. Second, double loop learning occurs when errors are 
corrected by changing governing values and subsequent actions. Thus single loop learning 
produces change within the existing organizational culture, while double loop learning leads 
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organizations to re-evaluate governing values and, potentially, change the culture and 
practices more fundamentally. Moving from single loop learning to double loop learning 
allows organizations to adjust their culture so that they can escape the clutches of ‘cultures of 
entrapment’ which produce antilearning (Sutcliffe and Weick, 2003: 73). Antilearning occurs 
when an organization’s members remain blind to incompetencies and inefficiencies, resulting 
in inadequate performance that can harm the organization and its stakeholders (Argyris, 
1993; Argyris and Schön, 1996).  
Public inquiries, sensemaking and learning  
Sensemaking and learning are both relevant to public inquiries. Research has found 
that, in addition to the sensemaking that occurs (or fails to occur) during both natural and 
man-made disasters (e.g., Weick, 1993), sensemaking also takes place in the public inquiries 
that often follow (e.g., Brown, 2000; Brown and Jones, 2000; Gephart, 1984). In reviewing 
what happened during the disaster or crisis, public inquiries make sense of it, often in ways 
that establish accountability, rebuild public confidence and restore an organization’s 
legitimacy where failure is evident. Much of this research, accordingly, emphasizes the 
ceremonial and ritualized nature of inquiries and the way in which they create normalized 
versions of the ‘truth’ (Brown, et al., 2015). Consequently, through rhetorical accounts, 
public inquiries will often protect the dominance of powerful organizations, often at the 
expense of individuals (e.g., Brown, 2004; Gephart, 1993).  
Some researchers claim that the ritualized and political aspects of public inquiries 
serve to inhibit learning (e.g., Buchanan, 2011). Nevertheless, public inquiries are generally 
expected to result in some form of learning and lead to changes in subsequent practices in 
order that organizations might respond more effectively in the future (Elliott, 2009). 
Moreover, some studies have demonstrated that public inquiries of disasters do prompt 
managers to implement change. For example, Bowman and Kunreuther (1988) show how 
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data generated from multiple public inquiries triggered safety management initiatives in a 500 
Fortune chemical company. Similarly, Turner (1976: 381) demonstrates how ‘cultural 
readjustment’ occurred in UK state organizations following the Aberfan coalmine accident in 
Wales (1966-67), the Hixon level crossing collision in England (1968) and the Summerland 
leisure complex fire in Isle of Man (1974). However, we still know relatively little about how 
sensemaking and learning during a public inquiry lead to organizations being better prepared 
for the future. This study therefore explores the relationship between sensemaking and 
learning activities during public inquiry processes after dynamically complex events, as well 
as examining the processes leading to changes in organizational practices that occur after 
inquiries have run their course. 
Methodology and research design 
Our research is qualitative and interpretive insofar as it examines ‘the meanings in use 
by societal members to explain how they directly experience everyday life realities’ and 
examines how particular meanings become shared (Gephart, 2004: 457). We chose such an 
approach because sensemaking and learning can be considered to be interpretive processes 
(Argyris, 1978; Gephart, 1993; Maitlis, 2005; Brown et al., 2015) and we are interested in 
how public inquiries create meanings for the events that give rise to them, as well as for the 
changes that may follow them. We examine three case studies of bushfires and conduct a 
textual analysis of the reports produced by three public inquiries. In doing so, we recognize 
that a public inquiry report is: 
an artefact that has resulted from authorial strategies of selection and omission 
of material, and which makes use of rhetorical devices … to present an (not 
the only) understanding of events (Brown, 2000: 49).  
Inquiries are ceremonial events with certain ritualized procedures (Gephart, 1984), embedded 
in a particular cultural and legal context (Brown, 2000), whose aim is to produce accounts 
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that are plausible, verisimilitudinous, and authoritative (Brown, et al., 2012). Accordingly, 
when we infer instances of sensemaking and learning from such reports, we do not claim that 
they are ‘correct’ or ‘accurate’ in their representation of events. Instead, we suggest that 
sensemaking and learning are ‘manifest in language, text and discourse including 
conversations, vocabularies, utterances and documents’ (Gephart, 1997: 588), and can 
therefore be discerned from the analysis of such language.  
In addition to inquiry reports, we also analyze other texts that were related to the 
inquiries but produced afterwards as a form of ‘intertextuality’ (Fairclough, 1992). When 
texts draw on, react to and transform other texts, certain conclusions can be drawn. For 
example, in our analysis, when public inquiry reports were referred to in other texts, we were 
able to make inferences as to whether learning may have taken place. Similarly, insofar as 
these other texts reported on changes made (or not made) following the inquiries, they 
provided us with evidence for subsequent changes in organizational practices. In analyzing 
these texts in this way, we make no inference as to whether the learning was ‘correct’ or 
whether these changes actually worked. Nor do we use these texts as a form of triangulation, 
whereby multiple data sources are assumed to represent reality more accurately. Rather, we 
acknowledge that the views offered in these other texts are subjective and that each genre has 
its own institutionalized protocols, which shape the rhetoric of their accounts. Nonetheless, 
these data are still useful to explore learning during and after public inquiries. Finally, we 
recognize that this paper is, itself, an attempt to craft an authoritative account and we deploy 
rhetoric in ways consistent with the genre of a scholarly article in order to appeal to our 
particular audience (cf. Currie and Brown, 2003).  
We selected the three case studies – the Black Friday Fires in 1939, the Ash 
Wednesday Fires in 1983 and the Black Saturday Fires in 2009 – because they were 
perceived to be three of the most significant and damaging natural disasters in Victoria, 
during which a considerable number of lives and properties were lost (Griffiths, 2010). It 
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therefore appeared likely that sensemaking would occur in the public inquiries that followed 
them, as in the case of other public inquires dealing with crises (e.g., Gephart, 1984; Gephart 
et al., 1990; Brown, 2000; Brown and Jones, 2000). Equally, we felt that we would be able to 
discern evidence of learning (or its absence) from inquiry reports and related texts insofar as 
public inquiries are expected to be an important vehicle for learning in Australia (Prasser, 
1985); and Griffiths (2010) argues that these reports did have a significant influence on 
emergency management in Victoria. Finally, we felt that the analysis of three case studies 
would provide more robust findings that selecting a single event.   
Data collection 
We collected the reports of the public inquiries: the Report of the Royal Commission 
to Inquire into the Bush Fires of January, 1939 (Black Friday Bushfires; the Report of the 
Bushfire Review Committee, 16 February 1983) Ash Wednesday Bushfires; and the Report 
of the Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission 2009 (Black Saturday Bushfires). We 
augmented these reports with other texts that were related to the three public inquiries, but 
produced afterwards. Using Factiva, which is a search engine for newspaper articles, TV and 
radio transcripts, journals, etc., we identified 20 publicly available interviews with senior fire 
fighters, commissioners and politicians, 17 newspaper articles and 4 web-blogs (see Table 1). 
These texts were collected because they provided (albeit subjective) views of whether and 
how sensemaking and learning occurred both during and after the inquiries.  
< Table 1 here > 
Data analysis 
An interpretive approach was used to analyze whether the texts contained evidence of 
sensemaking and learning and to explore the nature of these processes. Rereading the texts, 
and relating them to our understanding of sensemaking and learning from the literature, we 
were able to identify ‘themes, meanings and patterns in textual data’ (cf. Gephart, 1997: 585), 
from which categories were constructed. These categories became an emergent theory that 
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provided the basis for an inductively derived model showing patterns of sensemaking and 
learning (cf. Gephart, 1993). 
In the first instance, we examined the public inquiry reports for evidence that the 
bushfires were perceived to be novel, given our interest in how sensemaking and learning 
occur in response to novel conditions of dynamic complexity. Table 2 shows how perceptions 
of novelty were inferred from references in the inquiry reports to the bushfires as 
‘unprecedented’, ‘previously unseen’, ‘catastrophic’, ‘new’, unforeseen’, ‘unchartered’, 
‘unknown’. By exploring the excerpts containing these terms, we were able to identify 
references to accounts by individuals who saw the fires as novel at the time, as well as 
instances where conclusions of novelty were drawn from the inquiries’ overall deliberations. 
The inquiry reports were then examined for evidence of sensemaking. Excerpts containing 
references to ‘understanding’, ‘listening’, ‘review’, and ‘deliberations’ were identified. We 
then explored these excerpts in more detail to see whether there was evidence that the process 
of receiving submissions, holding hearings, conducting deliberations and writing a report had 
served to make sense of the fires for those involved. 
< Table 2 here > 
The next stage of analysis was to look for evidence of learning. In the context of 
public inquiries, we conceptualized single loop learning in terms of explanations of what had 
happened and why during the bushfires. We therefore identified and explored excerpts in the 
inquiry reports containing references to terms like ‘learning’ ‘lessons’, ‘mistake’, and 
‘experience’ – looking for evidence of such explanations. We conceptualized double loop 
learning in the context of the inquiry in terms of recommendations for more fundamental 
change. We therefore examined excerpts in inquiry reports containing references to 
‘learning’, ‘continuous learning’, lessons learned’, ‘re-evaluate’, ‘review’ ‘fundamental’, 
‘change’ and ‘system’ to identify and explore recommendations for fundamental change. We 
also identified double loop learning that extended beyond the inquiries in the form of 
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subsequent changes in emergency management organizations. To do so, we examined texts 
produced subsequent to the inquiries to see if they provided accounts of fundamental changes 
made after the inquiry and to identify independent views from experts, fire fighters, 
journalists and politicians as to whether such learning had taken place. We recognize that 
views of fundamental change – including our own – are subjective.  
Finally, we explored the link between inquiry recommendations and subsequent 
changes in organizational practices. Here, we analyzed excerpts from inquiry reports 
detailing recommendations for fundamental changes; and compared them to accounts in 
subsequent texts detailing how these recommendations were implemented in the form of 
changes in organizational practices. In this way, we identified what we refer to as ‘learning 
cues’ in the inquiry reports, as texts produced after the inquiry referred back to certain 
recommendations in order to explain, justify or introduce changes in organizational practices.  
Findings 
In this section, we first show evidence of novelty, sensemaking and learning in 
relation to all three inquiries. We conclude by presenting the particular dynamics associated 
with each of the three fires.  
Novelty and sensemaking  
The analysis of the inquiry reports suggests that all three bushfires were interpreted as 
representing novel conditions that had not been experienced before. The reports conveyed 
this novelty by drawing attention to unprecedented antecedent conditions before and during 
the major fires. In all three cases, inquiry reports constructed the fire as so overwhelming that 
individuals could not make sense of it at the time. Such was the unprecedented nature of all 
three fires that actors struggled to frame what was going on, recognize cues and bring their 
existing knowledge to bear on the situation. All three reports concluded that these particular 
bushfires were novel, unprecedented events, based on witness accounts and expert 
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assessments of conditions at the time of the bushfire: 
The speed of the fires was appalling. Balls of crackling fire sped at a great 
pace in advance of the fires, consuming with a roaring, explosive noise, all 
that they touched. Houses of brick were seen and heard to leap into a roar of 
flame before the fires had reached them. Some men of science hold the view 
that the fires generated and were preceded by inflammable gases which 
became alight (Report of Black Friday Inquiry; Parliament of Victoria, 1939: 
5) 
Inquiry reports argued that, because of this novelty, existing procedures had failed to contain 
the fires, allowing them to escalate significantly and detrimentally. The resulting loss of life 
and damage to property was so great that it should never be allowed to happen again, 
Black Saturday wrote itself into Victoria’s history with record-breaking 
weather conditions and bushfires of a scale and ferocity that tested human 
endurance. (Report of Black Saturday Inquiry; Parliament of Victoria, 2010: 
vii) 
If novelty had made it difficult for emergency services to respond adequately to the 
fires at the time, then sense needed to be made of that novelty retrospectively, through the 
submissions, hearings and, ultimately, the inquiry report.  
[T]he truly disastrous proportions reached on 16 February, 1983, constituted 
an unmistakable peak in the disaster record of the State. It was clear, therefore, 
that in spite of experience of past bushfires and the lessons learned from them, 
the events of the 1982/83 season needed careful analysis and evaluation. To 
this end, in conjunction with other initiatives, the Government decided to 
establish a Bushfire Review Committee (Report of the Ash Wednesday 
Inquiry; Parliament of Victoria, 1984: 2) 
The inquiries helped to make sense of the past – the apparent novelty of the bushfire could 
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only to be understood through a post-hoc inquiry. However, this attempt at comprehension of 
past events was clearly made with a view to safeguarding the future.  
We have seen the pain people have endured and continue to bear and, we 
know it will be a long road to full recovery for many. Bushfire is an intrinsic 
part of Victoria’s landscape, and if time dims our memory we risk repeating 
the mistakes of the past. We need to learn from the experiences of Black 
Saturday and improve the way we prepare for and respond to bushfires 
(Report of Black Saturday Inquiry, Parliament of Victoria, 2010: vii). 
In this way, the inquiry reports adopted a prospective outlook in relation to future 
learning. 
I am determined that this Royal Commission report is never allowed to gather 
dust. It is crucial that we grasp the opportunity now to make our State safer. I 
am equally determined that the path forward unites all Victorians in one 
commitment to do all we can to preserve human life in the face of the threat of 
bushfires (Premier of Victoria, quoted in Department of Premier and Cabinet, 
2010: para.10). 
Single loop and double loop learning  
In making sense of the bushfires, the inquiry reports also provided accounts that 
indicated single loop learning in the form of explanations of what had happened during each 
of the bush fires and why it had happened.  
Except that the summer of 1938-39 was unusually dry and that it followed 
what had already been a period of drought, the causes of the 1939 bushfires 
have been immediate and remote causes. [I]t will appear that no one cause 
may properly be said to have been the sole cause. The major, over-riding 
cause, which comprises all others, is the indifference with which forest fires, 
as a menace to the interests of us all, have been regarded (Report of the Black 
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Friday Inquiry, Parliament of Victoria, 1939: 11)  
There was also evidence of double loop learning insofar as some inquiry recommendations 
identified a need to re-evaluate systems that had been considered adequate before the 
unprecedented nature of fires exposed their limitations. The inquiry reports suggested that 
preparing for and responding to future bushfires on the scale of those recently experienced 
would require new practices, routines and, in some instances, new systems.  
 [W]e need to learn the lessons so that problems can be avoided in the future. 
The Commission therefore examined the policies, systems and structures 
needed to ensure that government, fire and emergency services agencies and 
individuals make informed, effective decisions about their response to 
bushfires in a way that protects life and minimises loss. (Report of Black 
Saturday Inquiry, Parliament of Victoria, 2010: 4) 
The inquiries were, then, a first step insofar as recommendations argued for a need for 
fundamental changes in the system of bushfire management that, in turn, would require 
changes in the practices of specific organizations.  
A legacy for governments or a legacy for a fire leader I think will be to 
introduce these recommendations over time to avoid, as best we can, these sort 
of events that occurred on the seventh of February (Jack Rush, Queens 
Counsel assisting the Black Saturday Inquiry, interviewed by Fyfe, 2010). 
Thus double loop learning extended beyond the inquiries as changes were implemented in 
organizations responsible for bushfire management. For example, a Park Ranger who had 
witnessed the Ash Wednesday Fires commented on changes that followed the public inquiry: 
Ash Wednesday had jolted fire-fighting services to re-examine how they 
tackled bushfire. From communications, to the way we transport people, to the 
way we use aircraft, dozers, the way we configure people across the 
landscape. It made us look hard at that. It made us look at how we configure 
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our incident management teams, how we train people (McAloon, 2008: para. 
15-16).  
Similarly, changes were announced following the Black Saturday Royal Commission 
including: ‘reducing fuel load on public land while monitoring and carefully managing the 
ecological consequences of such action; maintaining strategic fire breaks to protect 
communities and their critical assets, such as water; limiting known fire-starting activities on 
days with a dangerous fire risk; and encouraging individuals living in unacceptably high 
bushfire risk areas to relocate to safer environments’ (Victoria’s Emergency Services 
Minister quoted in Department of Premier and Cabinet, 2011: para.10).  
Learning cues 
In tracing links between inquiry recommendations for fundamental changes and 
accounts of changes being implemented subsequently, we identified what we refer to as 
‘learning cues’. Like sensemaking cues, learning cues are key fragments of information that 
serve as ‘stimuli that gain attention and engender action’ (cf. Colville et al., 2014: 217). They 
are not pre-determined or pre-existing but, rather, are constructed as actors draw on particular 
fragments of text from inquiry recommendations to explain, justify and initiate subsequent 
changes in organizational practices. In this way, learning cues appear to help extend the 
double loop learning that occurs during the inquiry to the wider setting, providing a basis for 
subsequent changes in organizational practices.  
Sensemaking and learning in the three bushfires 
In this section, we present a summary of the sensemaking and learning dynamics that 
characterize each of the three bushfires. In the case of Black Friday (1939), sensemaking 
constructed the bushfire as Australia’s worst natural disaster – a novel event compounded by 
a chronic drought and a lack of accountability. In making sense of this novelty, the inquiry 
engaged in single loop learning by offering explanations as to why the fire occurred and  
escalated to such a seemingly unprecedented extent. These explanations included the lack of 
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fire-related organizations with responsibility for managing risk in regional areas, an absence 
of forest management and conflict among various organizations. Recommendations included 
the need for a State fire authority, new guidelines for planned burning and clearer 
responsibilities for land and forest management. These proposals served as learning cues in 
that they were referred to in subsequent texts discussing changes in organizational practices. 
These changes included the establishment of the Country Fire Authority (CFA) whose 
jurisdiction included fires on private land in regional areas; the institutionalization of planned 
burning and the introduction of the 1939 Forest Act, giving the existing Forest Commission 
complete control of fire management on public land. These changes can be considered to 
involve double loop learning insofar as they changed the assumptions of emergency 
management in Victoria in ways that continue to the present day.  
<Table 3 here> 
In the case of Ash Wednesday (1983), we again observed that sensemaking 
constructed the bushfires as novel – the worst natural disaster to date owing to the early onset 
of summer and irregular fire behavior (Table 4). Single loop learning occurred insofar as 
explanations in inquiry reports explained the damage caused by the fire in terms of 
conservative planning on the part of the community, the need for more effective responses 
from emergency management organizations, and the need for better understanding of fire 
behavior. Recommendations regarding new education programs, new partnership 
arrangements and formal modelling of fire typologies served as learning cues in that they 
were referred to in subsequent texts discussing changes in organizational practices. These 
changes included a new ‘Stay or Go’ policy, which was an education program to assist 
communities living in high bushfire risk areas in their preparation for the fire season. Other 
changes involved new partnership arrangements and the institutionalization of fire modelling. 
These changes can be considered to involve double loop learning insofar as the ‘Stay or Go’ 
policy was developed collaboratively as a result of new partnership arrangements introduced 
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through legislation. It remained the cornerstone of Victoria’s bushfire safety program for 
more than 25 years, while the new fire management strategy became established practice. 
<Table 4 here> 
Inquiry sensemaking in the case of Black Saturday (2009) constructed these fires as 
the country’s worst natural disaster resulting from a severe heatwave and an absence of 
leadership in the line of command and control authority. Single loop learning explained the 
severity of the fire in terms of individuals lacking bushfire safety plans, the build-up of fuel, 
and the lack of clarification regarding the line of command and control authority. 
Recommendations regarding fire warnings, planned burn-offs and a review of the co-
ordination of fire management organizations served as learning cues in that they were 
referred to in subsequent texts discussing changes in organizational practices. These changes 
included new forms of warning, defined burn-off targets and legislation for a new position of 
Fire Services Commissioner. Again, these changes can be considered to enact double loop 
learning insofar as they involved radical changes to existing policies and changes in the 
organization of the overall fire management system. 
<Table 5 here> 
Sensemaking and learning were thus embodied in the deliberative processes of the 
three public inquiries. Single loop learning resulted in explanations of what happened and 
why in inquiry reports, while evidence of double loop learning was found in the form of 
recommendations for more fundamental changes. Learning cues in the recommendations 
appeared to gain attention and engender action insofar as they were referred to in relation to 
subsequent changes in the practices of organizations responsible for bushfire management. 
Discussion  
Our findings allow us to propose a general model regarding sensemaking and learning 
during – and after – public inquiries as events move from natural disaster, through the public 
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inquiry deliberations and report, to the aftermath of the inquiry. See Figure 1.  
<Figure 1 near here> 
First, in all three public inquiries, novelty was attributed to particular circumstances in 
the natural environment that accounted for these ‘unprecedented’ natural disasters. At the 
same time, all three inquiries clearly indicated that similar conditions could be expected to 
occur again in the future. According to inquiry reports, these novel conditions had taken 
emergency management practitioners by surprise and inhibited sensemaking at the time. We 
propose that the construction of novelty helps to justify the need for a public inquiry to 
provide retrospective sensemaking in order to manage future conditions more effectively.  
Second, sensemaking during the inquiry reduces the equivocality of the novelty in 
that it helps to create shared understandings, making it possible to construct plausible 
explanations of what happened and why. We therefore also propose that sensemaking 
provides the basis for single loop learning to occur during the inquiry, as well as double loop 
learning in the form of inquiry recommendations for more fundamental changes.  
Third, for inquiries to lead to changes in organizational practices, double loop 
learning must extend beyond the inquiry. We propose that this process is facilitated by 
learning cues – stimuli that gain attention and engender action, signifying to others of a need 
for a specific change, and allowing actors to move from a state of disorder about past events 
to a new order about future events (cf. Colville et al., 2014) which, in turn, aids the 
introduction of changes in organizational practices following the inquiry.  
Our model helps to develop new theory concerning the link between sensemaking and 
learning. Whereas Schwandt (2005) suggests that sensemaking and learning are in tension 
with each other, our study suggests that sensemaking is a basis for learning. Only after sense 
is made can learning occur. Additionally, whereas Schwandt (2005) suggests that 
sensemaking may preclude more fundamental learning because actors interpret equivocal 
cues to align with current knowledge, our study suggests that double loop learning can still 
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occur. There is, then, considerable scope for further research to explore the relationship 
between sensemaking and learning in more detail. The temporal component is particularly 
interesting (Colville at al., 2014). Our model suggests that, initially, sensemaking is high and 
learning low as actors struggle with equivocality. As sense is made, sensemaking activities 
reduce over time while learning increases, moving from single loop to double loop learning. 
Ethnographic studies of inquiries would be helpful in investigating the real-time dynamics of 
sensemaking and learning during the deliberative processes of an inquiry. 
Our model also builds on the work of Colville et al. (2014) who show the links 
between sensemaking, learning and change within an organization. Our study shows how 
these activities can transcend organizational boundaries by ‘moving’ from the organization 
that is the public inquiry into the myriad of organizations that constitute its subject matter. In 
this regard, we introduce the concept of the learning cue, which appears to play a role in this 
transition. There has been considerable interest in sensemaking cues (e.g., Colville et al., 
2013), and we feel there is potential for similar research into learning cues, which are 
similarly equivocal. What constitutes a learning cue – why are some textual fragments taken 
up and not others? How do they gain attention and engender action, and signify change to 
others? Do they serve a cognitive function in that certain textual fragments spark learning? 
Are they rhetorical insofar as some fragments of texts are most effective in persuading other 
organizational members of the need for change? Or are they political in that certain textual 
fragments gain political momentum and visibility, making it easier for organizations to 
implement them? Also, what happens when potential learning cues ‘fail’ and are not picked 
up? How does this affect the outcomes of an inquiry?  
In sum, our model suggests that sensemaking and learning processes do not end with 
the inquiry report and, if organizations are to address novel events and turbulent conditions, 
sensemaking and double loop learning must extend beyond the inquiry (cf. Brown et al., 
2015). Our model offers some proposals as to how this happens and suggests avenues for 
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future research. For example, more research is required to examine the process of 
‘transitioning’ out of the inquiry into the organization. Does sense also have to be made of 
the inquiry and its report by organizational members before they can engage in double loop 
learning and introduce new practices? If so, how do these processes occur? What effect does 
the backdrop of the inquiry have? The construction of a disaster as a novel event appears to 
frame the sensemaking and learning that occurs during an inquiry; how, then, does the 
construction of blame and accountability that typically occurs during public inquiries frame 
the sensemaking and learning that follows? How does being called to appear in front of the 
inquiry influence organizational members responsible for implementing changes in 
organizational practices? 
We recognize that there are a number of limitations associated with our research. 
First, our findings are a product of our interpretations of publicly available texts. Hence, like 
scholars before us, our findings and contributions are a subjective and idiosyncratic reflection 
of our qualitative and interpretive methodology (e.g., Brown, 2004; Gephart, 1993). Second, 
other texts may have told a different story: practitioners and politicians may have different 
private views than those expressed in public inquiries. Third, our inferences concerning 
double loop learning into the organizational setting are based on publicly available texts and 
not on direct interviews with, or observations of, organizational members. Also, our study 
includes no measurement of the effectiveness of the individual changes in preventing and 
managing bushfires. Our model can only propose relationships that will require further 
research to establish. Finally, we acknowledge that, like the texts on which we base our 
study, this article is itself an artefact, produced by our authorial strategies and use of rhetoric 
to produce a particular account (cf. Brown, 2000). These limitations notwithstanding, our 
study does suggest some promising avenues for future research.  
Our model also has important practical implications. Developing and implementing 
new organizational practices is a difficult challenge for management practitioners, 
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particularly when the organization has lived through traumatic events such as a crisis 
(Pearson and Clair, 1998). Organization resilience is further tested when practitioners are 
called to give evidence before public inquiries and, in some instances, blamed for how they 
managed certain activities (see Vince and Saleem, 2004). To alleviate some of these 
challenges our paper suggests that practitioners might seek to identify learning cues which 
they can use to explain, justify and initiate change, a necessary first step in advancing double 
loop learning and developing new organizational practices. Our model also has implications 
for the conduct of inquiries whose commissioners have the vantage of hindsight not afforded 
to those practitioners managing the disaster at the time. Often these practitioners are blamed 
even though the inquiry report suggests that the event under review was novel (Gephart, 
1993). We suggest that more procedural emphasis on sensemaking and learning during public 
inquiries, rather than allocating blame, may result in more robust learning cues that help 
practitioners to change organizational practices more easily. Consequently, we encourage 
further research that actively involves those who have lived through events like the ones 
described here. Such studies may not only increase meaningful learning, but also have a 
cathartic effect whereby actors can reflect on their experiences of a major event and broker 
them into learning and change, hence returning the organization to a new state of sense after 
turbulent times. 
Conclusion 
 In the case of natural disasters, government and communities must continue to look 
to the future when engaging in sensemaking and learning to ensure that they are 
implementing change that is not blind to the risks ahead. History has the tendency to repeat 
itself – albeit in novel ways. It seems likely that emergency management organizations in 
Victoria will continue to be challenged by the novelty of climate change. As one Australian 
environmental scientist has commented: 
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Worryingly, since 2009 we have experienced more days of ‘catastrophic’ fire 
danger, and this number will very likely increase in the future. Fire frequency 
and intensity is also predicted to increase in already fire-prone areas – areas in 
which a large proportion of the Australian population lives (Flannery, 2013: 
para. 8). 
The need to encourage and foster double loop learning remains an ongoing challenge 
especially since the impetus for change tends to drop away after the disaster in question fades 
from memory (Griffiths, 2010). Yet the experiences of those who have lived through such 
events should remind us of the need to continue to make sense and learn from them: 
In the usual course of life you cannot gain experience without paying a price 
but in the experience of the many bushfire-affected families of this state and 
those in charge of the systems … the price has been immeasurable … It is 
tragic to pay the price for the experience and not learn the lesson (Ms 
Scherman who lost family members on Black Saturday, quoted in Parliament 





Argyris C (1976) Single loop and double loop models in research on decision making. 
 Administrative Science Quarterly 21(3): 363–75. 
 
Argyris C and Schön D (1978) Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective. 
 Reading, MA: Addison–Wesley.  
 
Argyris C and Schön D (1996) Organizational Learning II. Reading, MA: Addison–Wesley. 
 
Argyris C (1993) Knowledge for Action. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
 
Birkman J ed., (2006) Measuring Vulnerability to Natural Hazards: Towards Disaster 
Resilient Societies. New York: United Nations University Press. 
 
Bowman E and Kunreuther H (1988) Post Bhopal behaviour at a chemical company. Journal 
of Management Studies 25(4): 387–400. 
 
Bracks S (2003) The Decisionmakers [Online Documentary]. Retrieved from: 
http://www.abc.net.au/blackfriday/aftermath/sbracks.html. 
 
Brown AD (2000) Making sense of inquiry sensemaking. Journal of Management Studies 
37(1): 45–75. 
 
Brown AD (2004) Authoritative sense-making in a public inquiry report. Organization 
Studies 25(1): 95–112. 
 
Brown AD, Ainsworth S and Grant D (2012) The rhetoric of institutional change. 
Organization Studies 33(3): 297–321. 
 
Brown AD, Colville I and Pye A (2015) Making Sense of Sensemaking in Organization 
Studies. Organization Studies 36(2): 265–277. 
 
Brown AD and Jones M (2000) Honourable members and dishonourable deeds: 
Sensemaking, impression management and legitimation in the arms to Iraq affair. 
Human Relations 53(5): 655–689. 
 
Buchanan DA (2011) Reflections: good practice, not rocket science–understanding failures to 
change after extreme events. Journal of Change Management 11(3): 273–288. 
 
Colville I, Brown AD and Pye A (2012) Simplexity: Sensemaking, organizing and 
storytelling for our time. Human Relations 65(1): 5–15. 
 
Colville I, Hennestad B and Thoner K (2014) Organizing, changing and learning: A 
sensemaking perspective on an ongoing ‘soap story’. Management Learning 45(2): 
216–234. 
 
Colville I, Pye A and Brown A (2013) Sensemaking and learning for interesting times. 




Colville I, Pye A and Carter M (2013) Organizing to counter terrorism: Sensemaking amidst 
dynamic complexity. Human Relations 66(9): 1201–1223. 
 
Crossan MM, Lane, HW and White, RE (1999) An organizational learning framework: from 
intuition to institution. Academy of Management Review 24(3): 522–537. 
 
Currie G and Brown AD (2003) A narratological approach to understanding processes of 
organizing in a UK hospital. Human Relations 56(5): 563–586. 
 
Department of Premier and Cabinet (27 August, 2010) [Media Release]: Government Takes 




Department of Premier and Cabinet (31 May, 2011). [Media Release]: Bushfires 
Implementation Plan. Retrieved from: http://www.premier.vic.gov.au/media-
centre/media-releases/1080-bushfires-implementation-plan-tabled-in-parliament.html. 
 
Elliott D (2009) The failure of organizational learning from crisis–a matter of life and death? 
Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 17(3): 157–168. 
 
Fairclough N (1992) Discourse and Social Change. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Flannery T (9 December, 2013) [Media Article]: Reality bites as climate change adds fuels to 
bushfires. Retrieved from: http://www.theage.com.au/comment/reality-bites-as-
climate-change-adds-fuels-to-bushfires-20131208-2yz47.html#ixzz3DM6QLRZj 
 




Gephart RP (1984) Making sense of organizationally–based environmental disasters. Journal 
of Management 10(2): 205–225. 
 
Gephart RP (1993) The textual approach: Risk and blame in disaster sensemaking. Academy 
of Management Journal 36(6):1465–1514. 
 
Gephart RP (1997) Hazardous measures: An interpretive textual analysis of quantitative 
sensemaking during crises. Journal of Organizational Behavior 18:(S1), 583–622. 
 
Gephart RP (2004) Qualitative research and the Academy of Management Journal. Academy 
of Management Journal 47(4): 454–462. 
 
Gephart RP, Steier L and Lawrence T (1990) Cultural rationalities in crisis sensemaking: a 
study of a public inquiry into a major industrial accident. Organization & 
Environment 4(1): 27–48. 
 
Gephart RP, Topal C and Zhang Z (2010) Future-oriented sensemaking: Temporalities and 
institutional legitimation. In T. Hernes and S. Maitlis (eds) Process, sensemaking and 




Glade T, Felgentreff C and Birkmann J (2010) Editorial for the special issue: extreme events 
and vulnerability in environment and society. Natural Hazards 55(3): 571–576. 
 
Griffiths T (2010) An unnatural disaster?: Remembering and forgetting bushfire. History 
Australia 6(2): 35.1 –35.2. 
 
Lapsley C (7 February, 2014) [Media Release]: Black Saturday will never be forgotten. 
Retrieved from: http://www.emv.vic.gov.au/category/media–releases/2014/. 
 
Mantere S, Schildt HA and Sillince JA (2012) Reversal of strategic change. Academy of 
Management Journal 55(1): 172–196. 
 
Maitlis S (2005) The social processes of organizational sensemaking. Academy of 
Management Journal 48(1): 21–49. 
 
McAloon C (15 February, 2008) [Media Article]: Ash Wednesday 25 years on – the lessons 
learnt Retrieved from:http://www.abc.net.au/local/stories/2008/02/14/2163089.htm. 
 
Mileti D (1999) Disasters by Design: A Reassessment of Natural Hazards in the United 
States. National Academies Press. 
 
Morgan G (19 February, 2008) [Web Blog]: Ash Wednesday 25 Years On. Retrieved from: 
http://www.bushfirecrc.com/blog/gary–morgan/ash–wednesday–25–years. 
 
Parliament of Victoria (1939) Report of the Royal Commission to Inquire into the Causes of 
and Measures Taken to Prevent the Bush Fires of January, 1939, and to Protect Life 
and Property, and the Measures Taken to Prevent Bush Fires in Victoria and Protect 
Life and Property in the Event of Future Bush Fires 1939, Parliamentary paper 
(Victoria. Parliament) ; T. Rider, Acting Government Printer, Melbourne. 
 
Parliament of Victoria (1984) Report of the bushfire review committee : on bush fire disaster 
preparedness and response in Victoria, Australia, following the Ash Wednesday fires 
16 February 1983. 1984: Melbourne Government Printer. 
 
Parliament of Victoria (2010) Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission Final Report. Volume 
I—The Fires and the Fire–Related Deaths; Volume II—Fire Preparation, Response 
and Recovery; Volume III—Establishment and Operation of the Commission; and 
Volume IV—The Statements of Lay Witnesses). Ordered to be printed July 2010 by 
authority Government Printer for the State of Victoria. PP No. 332 – Session 2006–
10. 
 
Pearson CM and Clair JA (1998) Reframing crisis management. The Academy of 
Management Review 23(1): 59–76. 
 
Pelling M (2010) Adaptation to Climate Change: From Resilience to Transformation. 
London: Routledge. 
 
Prasser S (1985) Public inquiries in Australia: an overview. Australian Journal of Public 
Administration 44(1): 1–15. 
 





Schwandt DR (2005) When managers become philosophers: Integrating learning with 
 sensemaking. Academy of Management Learning and Education 4(2): 176–192. 
 
Sellnow TL, Seeger MW and Ulmer RR (2002) Chaos theory, informational needs, and 
natural disasters. Journal of Applied Communication Research 30(4): 269–292. 
 
Sutcliffe KM and Weick KE (2003) Hospitals as cultures of entrapment: a re–analysis of the 
Bristol Royal Infirmary. California Management Review 45(2): 73–84. 
 
Turner BA (1976) The organizational and interorganizational development of disasters. 
Administrative Science Quarterly 21(3): 378–397. 
 
Vince R and Saleem T (2004) The impact of caution and blame on organizational learning. 
Management Learning 35(2):133–154. 
 
Weick KE, Sutcliffe KM and Obstfeld D (2005) Organizing and the process of sensemaking. 
Organization Science 16(4): 409–421. 
 
Weick KE (1988) Enacted Sensemaking in Crisis Situations. Journal of Management Studies 
25(4): 305–317. 
 
Weick KE (1990) The Vulnerable System: An Analysis of the Tenerife Air Disaster. Journal 
of Management 16(3): 571–593. 
 
Weick KE (1993) The collapse of sensemaking in organizations: The Mann Gulch disaster. 
Administrative Science Quarterly 38(4): 628–652. 
 




Table 1: Sources of textual data  
Text source  Relevance  Number of sources  
1. Inquiry reports  Inquiry reports provide 
detailed accounts of 
sensemaking over a period of 
time with input from 
government, emergency 
management and community 
stakeholders, and provide 
evidence of learning.  
3 reports.  
2. Publicly available 
interviews 
Observers comment on 
whether they believe the public 
inquiry made sense of and 
learned lessons from the 
previous bushfire, as well as 
whether sensemaking, learning 
and change have occurred 
subsequently. 




3. Media articles  Media articles provide 
commentaries on whether the 
public inquiry made sense of 
and learned lessons from the 
previous bushfire, as well as 
whether sensemaking, learning 




4. Web–blogs  Web–blogs provide 
commentaries on whether the 
public inquiry made sense of 
and learned lessons from the 
previous bushfire, as well as 
whether sensemaking, learning 
and change have occurred 
subsequently. 










Table 2: Illustration of codes and quotes for key themes 
Indicative codes Quotes 
Novelty 
References to a bushfire 






Analysis of excerpts from 
inquiry reports undertaken 
to discern whether and 
how the bushfire was 
constructed in relation to 
novelty. 
Report of Inquiry: 1939 Black Friday 
‘There had been no fires to equal these in destructiveness or intensity in the 
history of settlement in this State, except perhaps the fires of 1851, which, 
too, came at summer culmination of a long drought’ (Parliament of 
Victoria, 1939: 6). 
Report of Inquiry: 1983 Ash Wednesday 
‘[T]heir extent and severity, especially in terms of the truly disastrous 
proportions reached on 16 February 1983, constituted an unmistakable peak 
in the disaster record of the State’ (Parliament of Victoria, 1984: 12 ). 
Report of Inquiry: 2009 Black Saturday 
‘Although the fires of January–February 2009 were catastrophic, they were 
not the first fires to gravely affect the State of Victoria. The outcome of 
these fires, however–especially the loss of life–surpassed that of past fires’ 
(Parliament of Victoria, 2010: xvi).  
Sensemaking 
References to the bushfire 





Analysis of excerpts from 
inquiry reports undertaken 




Report of Inquiry: 1939 Black Friday  
‘To enable a report of full effect to be made, it would be necessary to 
inquire into and resolve the preliminary problem of the co–ordination of 
control of forest lands by, and recognition and preservation of the rights of, 
the various persons and departments whose interests are rooted in the soil 
of the forests; to inquire into the constitution and administration of some of 
these departments;…’ (Parliament of Victoria, 1939: 7).  
Report of Inquiry: 1983 Ash Wednesday 
‘The aim of this report therefore is to consider factors relevant to the 
bushfires which occurred in Victoria during the 1982/83 season particularly 
those of 16 February 1983 and to make any necessary recommendation for 
countering disaster situations in the future’ (Parliament of Victoria, 1984: 
4). 
Report of Inquiry: 2009 Black Saturday 
‘As Commissioners, we concentrated on gaining an understanding of 
precisely what took place and how the risks of such a tragedy recurring 
might be reduced’ (Parliament of Victoria, 2010: vii). 
Single loop learning 




Analysis of excerpts from 
inquiry reports undertaken 
to discern evidence of 
single loop learning in the 
form of explanations of 
what happened and why. 
 
 
Report of Inquiry: 1939 Black Friday 
‘Except that the summer of 1938–39 was unusually dry and that it followed 
what already had been a period of drought, the causes of the 1939 bushfires 
were no different from those of any other summer. There were, as there 
always have been, immediate and remote causes. The major, over–riding 
cause, which comprises all others, is the indifference with which fires, as a 
menace to the interests of us all have been regarded …’ (Parliament of 
Victoria, 1939: 11). 
Report of Inquiry: 1983 Ash Wednesday  
‘It was clear, therefore, that in spite of experience of past bushfires and the 
lessons learned from them, the events of the 1982/83 season needed careful 
analysis and evaluation’ (Parliament of Victoria, 1984: 2). 
Report of Inquiry: 2009 Black Saturday  
‘The resultant evidence is the most comprehensive ever assembled about 
the circumstances of deaths in an Australian bushfire. It thus offers an 
unprecedented opportunity for analysis. Looking back on the experience of 
7 February, it is plain that on such days, when bushfires are likely to be 
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ferocious, leaving well before the fire arrives is the only way of ensuring 
one’s safety’ (Parliament of Victoria, 2009: 334). 
Double loop learning 







Analysis of excerpts from 
inquiry reports undertaken 
to discern evidence of 
double loop learning in the 
form of recommendations 




Analysis of excerpts from 
subsequent texts 
undertaken to discern 
accounts of change and 
views that learning 
occurred. 
Publicly available interview: 1939 Black Friday 
‘Fire–fighters are now trained to know when to retreat or leave, and they 
have the right back–up and support. None of those systems where in place 
then’ Steve Bracks, past Premier of Victoria. 
Publicly available interview: 1983 Ash Wednesday 
‘As a nation, did we learn from the experience? Of course we did. But that 
was never going to be enough. [I]t is the work of our bushfire scientists 
over the last two decades … that has made the greatest contribution to 
saving lives and property.’ Gary Morgan, past Chief Executive of the 
Bushfire Co-operative Research Centre (Bushfire CRC).  
Publicly available interview: 2009 Black Saturday  
‘The 2009 bushfires were subject to an exhaustive Royal Commission of 
Inquiry. That led to a series of fundamental changes, many of which are 
largely invisible to the public eye. But they are fundamental.’  
Craig Lapsley, current Emergency Management Commissioner. 
Learning Cues 
Analysis of accounts from 
subsequent texts referring 
back to recommendations 
in inquiry reports to 
explain, justify or initiate 
changes in organizational 
practices. 
Publicly available interview: 1939 Black Friday  
‘[I]t was a turning point in terms of structure and arrangement for fire 
prevention and fire suppression because when you look at the model [which 
included a state fire authority, planned burning and clearer responsibilities] 
which was proposed as a result of the 1939 Royal Commission …’  
Russell Rees, past CFA Chief Officer.  
Web-blog: 1983 Ash Wednesday  
‘The 1983 Ash Wednesday bushfires also provided a range of experiences 
to build upon. The suddenness, the velocity and the deadliness of those 
fires added considerable urgency as far as our need to know more about a 
range of variables such as fire behaviour and fire weather [referring to the 
need to model fire behaviour]. We needed better guidelines on how to 
manage the land for both bushfire protection and for its conservation value 
[referring to formalizing the management of major emergencies]’  
Gary Morgan, past Chief Executive of the Bushfire CRC. 
Publicly available interview: 2009 Black Saturday 
‘The primacy of human life is more obviously at the forefront of all of our 
activities. That is why the advice to leave a high bushfire area well in 
advance of a bushfire threat is so prominent in our communications. It is 
the safest option. Likewise, information and advice to the public is 
delivered in an integrated and varied way. The advice is as timely and 
relevant as it can be. The means of delivering this are improving all the 
time [referring to the need to review of ‘Stay or Go’ policy’ 





































































managing risk in 
regional areas. 
Recommendation for 
a State fire authority 
to educate citizens 
about the risk of fire 
in regional areas and 
to coordinate 
training of volunteer 
fire fighters. 
The CFA comes 
into existence in 
1945 to manage 
fire in regional 
areas on private 
land. 
Chronic drought. The fire occurred 
and escalated 
because there an 
absence of forest 
management.  
Recommendation for 
new guidelines for 
planned burning off 
of growth to reduce 
fuel hazards.  
Planned burning is 














among land and 
forest managers. 
The 1939 Forests 












































































natural disaster.  
The fire caused so 
much damage and 




planning for the 
risk of bushfire. 
Recommendation for 
new education 
program to educate 
people about fire risk 
and bushfire 
preparedness. 
The ‘Stay and 
Defend or Go 
Early’ policy is 
adopted. 
Early onset of 
summer. 
The fire caused 
losses and damages 
may have been less 
if fire management 
organizations were 
able to respond 
more effectively the 



















highlighted a need 




formal modelling of 
fire typologies in 
different terrains to 
improve planning and 
preventative action 
against bushfire.  
Fire modelling is 


























The actions of 
many people living 
in high fire danger 
areas on the day of 
7 February 2009 
showed that they 
did not have a 
robust bushfire 
safety plan.  
Recommendation for 
a review of the ‘Stay 
or Go’ policy and 
implementation of 
new technology to 
provide timely and 
relevant information 
to communities 
potentially at risk. 
 




harmful fires on 




The fires were 
exacerbated by a 
build–up of fuel 







organizations to burn 
a rolling target of 5 
per cent minimum of 
public land.   
There is now a 
defined target of 
land, which must 
be burned each 
year with an 
appraisal of how 
this activity is 
contributing to 
mitigating 
bushfire risk.  
 
There was an 




and control.  
The severity of the 














The 2010 Fire 
Services 
Commissioner 
Act established a 
new Fire Services 
Commissioner 
whose role is to 
coordinate and 
oversee the 

























































3%(.∃4∋∃225∋∃4/∗(%(.∋/(6∋74(748/9%(.∋ :2∀#∃4∋∃225∋∃4/∗(%(.∋/(6∋74(748/9%(.∋ !∀#∃%&∋&(∃%)∋( 
−,(30∀&0∃∃#&?;:&
)∃./0∀&0∃∃# 
0∀∋!(,(3 
∀
4
∀
(
%
&,−
&%
!
,3
3
∀
!
∀
)
& 
−∀(−∀+∋Λ,(3&+∃4∀−&5!∃+&6,36&%∃&0∃Μ& 
 
0∀∋!(,(3&+∃4∀−&5!∃+&0∃Μ&%∃&6,36& 
 
(∀Μ&
∃!3∋(,Ν∋%,∃(∋0& 
#!∋∗%,∗∀−& 
6,36&
0∃Μ&
0∃Μ&
6,36&
